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Nuts & Bolts of Hostile Work Environment Cases: Comparing Federal, NYS and NYC Law (NELA/NY Fall 2023 Conference, Friedman & Houlding LLP)

Comparison of key elements of hostile work environment claims under federal, NYC and the new NYSHRL law.

§296(1)(h): 1. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: (h) For an employer, licensing agency, employment agency or labor organization to subject any individual to harassment because of an individual's age, race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, familial status, marital status, status as a victim of domestic violence, or because the individual has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because the individual has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article, regardless of whether such harassment would be considered severe or pervasive under precedent applied to harassment claims. Such harassment is an unlawful discriminatory practice when it subjects an individual to inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual's membership in one or more of these protected categories. The fact that such individual did not make a complaint about the harassment to such employer, licensing agency, employment agency or labor organization shall not be determinative of whether such employer, licensing agency, employment agency or labor organization shall be liable. Nothing in this section shall imply that an employee must demonstrate the existence of an individual to whom the employee's treatment must be compared. It shall be an affirmative defense to liability under this subdivision that the harassing conduct does not rise above the level of what a reasonable victim of discrimination with the same protected characteristic or characteristics would consider petty slights or trivial inconveniences.

§300: Construction. The provisions of this article shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal civil rights laws, including those laws with provisions worded comparably to the provisions of this article, have been so construed. Exceptions to and exemptions from the provisions of this article shall be construed narrowly in order to maximize deterrence of discriminatory conduct.

Federal | NYSHRL§296(1)(h) | CityHRL Severe or Pervasive | Yes | Becker-Rendano v. NYS Off. of Info. Tech. Svcs,904264-20 (Alb. Sup., March, 2, 2021)(Patrick Sorsby for Plaintiff), demonstrates how §296(1)(h) has eliminated distinctions between hostile work environment and retaliation claims, on the one hand, and discrimination claims: both are now evaluated under the single standard set forth in the amendment, whether Defendant has subjected Plaintiff: “to inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s membership in one or more of these protected categories,” which now include persons who have engaged in protected activity. The decision is unavailable online so it is included in the materials following this table. For the sake of brevity, it is questionable whether the hostile work environment allegations would have survived under the previous sufficiently severe or pervasive to interfere with Plaintiff’s ability to perform her job. The court denied the motion to dismiss the hostile work environment alleged in amended complaint because: “plaintiff has adequately alleged that defendant engaged in conduct which subjected her to inferior terms, conditions or privileges of her employment because of her disability.” Id. at 8. The court held that Defendant’s argument that the alleged conduct was mere petty slights or trivial inconveniences could not be considered on a MTD because it was an affirmative defense. Id.See also Cunliffe v. Sandberg, 2022 NY Slip Op 32035(U), ¶ 4 (Sup. Ct.)(under the amended NYSHRL just defendant’s comment about the color of plaintiff nanny's face and her encouragement of her son to make similar comments on several occasions are sufficient to state a claim for hostile work environment.) The_Becker-Rendano_court also denied the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. Id. at 9. The court found that by including among the protected classes which may not be harassed in §296(1)(h)persons who had engaged in protected activity, the Legislature had overruled decisions such as “Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d at 313,” which had implied under §296(1)(e) a requirement that Plaintiff suffer an adverse employment action. §296(1)(h) is the first statute to define the substantive elements of a hostile work environment. Paired with §300, it effectively rearranges both the substantive law of hostile work environments and retaliation, and reduces them to the answer to the simple question posed in §296(1)(h). Courts are already noting that "the effect of [§300] is to render the standard for claims [brought under the NYSHRL] closer to the standard under the NYCHRL."Cherry v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth.,564 F. Supp. 3d 140,164 n.13(E.D.N.Y. 2021). | Experience has shown that there is a wide spectrum of harassment cases falling between "severe or pervasive" on the one hand and a "merely" offensive utterance on the other. 22 The City HRL is now explicitly designed to be broader and more remedial than the Supreme Court's "middle ground," a test that had sanctioned a significant spectrum of conduct demeaning to women. With this broad remedial purpose in mind, we conclude that questions of "severity" and "pervasiveness" are applicable to consideration of the scope of permissible damages, but not to the question of underlying liability. [D]efendants can still avoid liability if they prove that the conduct complained of consists of nothing more than what a reasonable victim of discrimination would consider "petty slights and trivial inconveniences." Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth.,2009 NY Slip Op 440, ¶ 15, 61 A.D.3d 62, 76, 80, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 38, 41 (App. Div. 1st Dept.)

Subjectively Offensive | Yes, but see_Meritor. | It would be worthwhile to use §300 and §296(1)(h) to demand that courts do away with the double standard applied only in sexual harassment cases, and only when the Plaintiff is a woman. This was the contribution of the_Meritor_Court. She is required to prove that she did not welcome the sexual harassment, whereas victims of racial harassment, disability harassment, religious harassment and all other forms of harassment based on protected categories need only prove that theyfound the hostile work environment subjectivelyoffensive. | Yes Reasonable Person Offensive | Yes | a reasonable victim of discrimination with the same protected characteristic or characteristics would consider [more than] petty slights or trivial inconveniences. | what a reasonable victim of discrimination would consider [more than] "petty slights and trivial inconveniences." Strict Liability for Supervisor Harassment | 1)Vance_supervisor harassment culminating in a tangible employment action.Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Inc.,163 F.3d 1236, 1247 (11th Cir. Fla. 1998)(“[T]he fact that the harasser was the decision maker for the tangible employment action gives rise to an inference that the harasser's discriminatory animus motivated that action.”); 2) Proxy liability. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 789, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2284 (1998)(Where the harasser was “president of the corporate employer [he] was indisputably within that class of an employer organization’s officials who may be treated as the organization’s proxy.”). | NYS law also recognizes strict liability under the Proxy doctrine. Sletten v. LiquidHub, Inc.,2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94697, at 31 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2014)(“Brassington, a proxy of LiquidHub itself, harbored animus against Sletten based on his sexual orientation); Matter of Winkler v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 2009 NY Slip Op 904, ¶ 1, 59 A.D.3d 1055, 1056, 872 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798 (App. Div. 4th Dept.)(accord construing NYSHRL) | §8-107 13. B. (1) An employer shall be liable for an unlawful discriminatory practice based upon the conduct of an employee or agent which is in violation of subdivision 1 or 2 of this section only where: (1) The employee or agent exercised managerial or supervisory responsibility

Supervisor Harassment Generally | Faragher/Ellerth: Employer is liable for harassment by_Vance supervisor unless it can prove the affirmative defense that 1) it had a policy against harassment where an employee could complain without fear of retaliation and 2) the employee failed to utilize the policy. As the Court held in_Vance, negligence is_always available_as a basis for liability in the case of supervisor harassment. That includes harassment perpetrated by supervisors who plainly meet the_Vance_standard. Negligence is usually a more flexible Plaintiff-friendly doctrine, because in using the_Vance supervisor F/E paradigm, courts tend to put Plaintiffs on trial for failing properly to utilize the complaint mechanism. The only question under the negligence doctrine is whether the employer owed a duty to prevent the harassment and whether it did enough to prevent it, by apprehending the danger of harassment and taking reasonable steps to prevent it from happening. For example, under F/E, a complaint to a low level supervisor may be deemed inadequate because the Employee Handbook mandates a complaint to a Manager, Human Resources or a Complaint Line. However under a negligence standard, such complaints are often deemed to put the employer on actual or constructive notice. | If courts follow the line of cases holding that supervisor liability standards are the same under Title VII and the NYSHRL, by prohibiting courts from relying on the absence of a complaint by Plaintiff to reject liability, §296(1)(h) will have a significant positive impact. The defense bar in several blogs on the amendment acknowledges that the new language rules out the F/E defense, and a couple of courts have reached the same conclusion in dictum.See Ortiz v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist.,No. 17-CV-2990 (DRH)(AYS), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38333, at 8 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2021)(“Eliminates…the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense.”); Chauhan v. MM Hotel Mgmt. LLC,No. 18-CV-5963 (DRH)(SIL), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199894, at 17 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2019)(same). However, as the NY COA explained in_Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind,3 N.Y.3d 295, 311-12, 786 N.Y.S.2d 382, 395, 819 N.E.2d 998, 1011 (2004) the standard of liability for supervisor and coworker harassment under the NYCHRL has always been whether the employer acquiesced in, or condoned, the harassment. Id. This was the harsh construction the COA accorded §296 which was silent on the standard for employer liability. So long as the Plaintiff continues to have the burden of proving the employer acquiesced, it makes no difference whether the employer is prohibited by the amendment from using the F/E affirmative defense on which it has the burden. It would have no reason to plead the defense. Yet one could imagine a court inferring §300 and the absence of a complaint may not be determinative language of §296(1)(h), as the legislative repudiation of the harsh construction NY judges accorded §296, which like Title VII was silent on the standard of liability. §300 requires a liberal construction “regardless of whether federal civil rights laws, including those laws with provisions worded comparably to the provisions of this article, have been so construed.” This can be understood as legislative overruling of standards less generous that Title VII, and requiring standards that are at least as generous. Cf. Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth.,2009 NY Slip Op 440, ¶ 4, 61 A.D.3d 62, 66, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 31 (App. Div. 1st Dept.)(“federal provisions…viewed ‘as a floor below which the City's Human Rights law cannot fall’”). | Strict liability

Coworker harassment liability | Negligence | “Acquiescence or condonation,” which the courts frequently call more demanding than negligence. There are two differences. Actual knowledge is required; constructive knowledge does not suffice. However State law offers one advantage: It is the only liability standard where an employer’s conduct evincing condonation after the harassment will subject it to liability.See Father Belle Cmty. Ctr. v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights,221 A.D.2d 44, 56, 642 N.Y.S.2d 739, 748 (App. Div. 4th Dept. 1996)(“Condonation may be established by knowledge acquired after the fact, combined with insufficient investigation and corrective action [citations omitted]. Here, although detailed complaints about Caruso's conduct were related to the Board of Directors, the Board as a whole undertook no serious investigation or meaningful action on behalf of the complainants. Instead, it took a series of actions that exacerbated complainants' injuries. The Board had failed to establish any policy concerning sexual harassment or mechanisms to allow the complainants to pursue harassment grievances in confidence.”) | Negligence based on actual or constructive knowledge §8-107 13. B. (2) The employer knew of the employee's or agent's discriminatory conduct, and acquiesced in such conduct or failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action; an employer shall be deemed to have knowledge of an employee's or agent's discriminatory conduct where that conduct was known by another employee or agent who exercised managerial or supervisory responsibility; or (3) The employer should have known of the employee's or agent's discriminatory conduct and failed to exercise reasonable diligence to prevent such discriminatory conduct.

3d Party harassment liability | Holds employers liable in negligence where they are aware of third party harassment and fail to take reasonable steps to protect employees.Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp.,750 F.3d 413, 423 (4th Cir. 2014)(“an employer is liable under Title VII for third parties creating a hostile work environment if the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed "to take prompt remedial action reasonably calculated to end the harassment.") | Yes. See_Swiderski v. Urban Outfitters, Inc.,No. 14-CV-6307 (JPO), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72291, at 9 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2015)(relying on the same negligence standard as applied under Title VII) | The City Law has no provision dealing with pure third-party harassment situations like customer harassment of employees, although it does expressly hold employers liable for violations by agents and independent contractors. See § 8-107. 1. “Employment. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: (a) For an employer or an employee or agent thereof, . . .” and §8-107 13. c. “An employer shall be liable for an unlawful discriminatory practice committed by a person employed as an independent contractor, other than an agent of such employer, to carry out work in furtherance of the employer's business enterprise only where such discriminatory conduct was committed in the course of such employment and the employer had actual knowledge of and acquiesced in such conduct. Nonetheless, because like language in Title VII is held to make employers liable in negligence for harassment committed by third parties such as customers, such liability should be possible, since_Williams_holds that Title VII provides a floor beneath which the City Law’s protections cannot fall.Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth.,2009 NY Slip Op 440, ¶ 4, 61 A.D.3d 62, 66, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 31 (App. Div. 1st Dept.) Punitive Damages | Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 529-530, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 2121 (U.S. 1999)(“Punitive damages are limited, however, to cases in which the employer has engaged inintentionaldiscriminationand has done so ‘with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.’ Rev. Stat. § 1977, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1).”) | NYS common law standard: whether the wrongdoer has engaged in discrimination with willful or wanton negligence, or recklessness, or a conscious disregard of the rights of others or conduct so reckless as to amount to such disregard(does not require intentionaldiscrimination as does Title VII) | Same as NYSHRL.Chauca v. Abraham,2017 NY Slip Op 08158, ¶ 5, 30 N.Y.3d 325, 334, 67 N.Y.S.3d 85, 91, 89 N.E.3d 475, 481 When suing the employer on a theory of vicarious liability must the harasser or manager who knew of it and failed to act be senior enough that his actions are imputed to the employer as required by_Kolstad.

Minimum Number of Employees | 15 (except under 42 USC § 1981 no minimum) | One | One Damage Caps | Yes, (except under 42 USC § 1981 none) | None | None Who can sue | Employees | Employees, independent contractors, consultants, vendors, subcontractors,andpersonsprovidingservicespursuant to a contract Who can be sued | Employer only | Employer, aider and abettor who participated in creating hostile work environment (includes coworkers), individual with ownership interest or the power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others.Tromblee v. New York,No. 1:19-cv-00638 (BKS/CFH), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51184, at 47 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2023). | Employer, employees (express liability in statute), agents (same), and anyone who can be sued under State law. Fellah v. City Univ. of N.Y.,2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179318, at 21-22 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30,2022)

Joshua Friedman (10 min)

Outline of Discussion of Federal State and City Hostile Work Environment Law

There is a table which compares the substantive and liability standard under federal, state and NYC law in your materials.

I am going to spend time first on the remarkable amendment to our State law, which takes us further than even the City Law concerning employer liability, and then focus on two substantive aspects of 296(1)(h) which dramatically change the law on retaliation and hostile work environment in NYS.

296(1)(h) Cleans up The Morass of Thinking Caused by Gap Filling

Title VII and state law are silent on harassment: 296(1)(a) states: It shall be illegal for an employer because of an individual's [protected class] to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.

Federal Courts assumed congress meant to prohibit harassment as conduct which violated the _ “terms conditions and privileges _ ,” language, but because the Court was imposing liability where Congress had not provided rules, there was a need to distinguish for which acts the employer should be liable. In _ Meritor _ the Court engaged in some gap filling. The Defendant argued that congress only intended to address tangible actions. The Court disagreed, pointing out that making a workplace hostile due to sex clearly altered the _ terms conditions and privileges _ under which the Plaintiff worked. The Court agreed that agency principles applied, but refused to set a standard, other than stating actual knowledge by the employer and failure to act (negligence), would be actionable. In F/E the Court created a confusing set of rules which were intended to be helpful to victims of supervisor harassment, such as when an employer could be held liable absent proof of fault.

The key point is that none of this federal case law about when the employer is liable would have been necessary had Congress simply written:

It shall be illegal for an employer because of an individual's [protected class] to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against or harass such individual in compensation or in terms, conditio ~~ns or privile~~ ges of employment.

NY took a similar route in concluding that terms or conditions encompassed harassment but it was up to the courts to decide the question of liability.

In Father Bell the 4 th Dpt clarified the distinction between federal and NYS law: Under New York law, in order to recover against an employer, the complainant must demonstrate that the employer acquiesced in the discriminatory conduct or subsequently condoned it. Father Belle Cmty. Ctr. v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights , 221 A.D.2d 44, 53-54, 642 N.Y.S.2d 739, 746 (App. Div. 4th Dept. 1996)

In 1991 when the City Council created the new NYCHRL it apparently did not attempt to insert the word harassment into the prohibitory language: “to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges,” which tracked federal and state language. The City Counsel simply created strict liability for harassment by someone with supervisory powers, and essentially negligence for others. You can read them in the table.

It is important to know that the courts ignored the plain language of the new NYCHRL which imposed strict liability for supervisor harassment, among other things for 15 years. In 2005 the Council passed the Restoration Act which forced courts to enforce the NYCHRL as written. We cannot let that happen to our new law which advances equality in so many ways and makes plain that an employer is liable when its employees work in a hostile work environment.

No matter. The courts dutifully ignored the new language holding it equivalent to federal law. In 2005 the Council passed the Restoration Act (RA), wholly the brainchild of Craig Gurian, which finally brought fealty to the intent of the Council. 25 years in the desert. But the RA left the different liability standards in place for harassment by employees of different authority. There was no rewrite of the main prohibitory statute to say: to

discriminate against or harass such individual in compensaton or in terms, i condit i ons or privileges.

Now, finally, there is a statute which expressly makes employers liable for harassment: 296(1)(h) 296(1)(h) lifted the cloud of federal and State, and even City thinking, which all resulted from the failure of Congress to expressly prohibit harassment. We need to lift that cloud from our own thinking.

Section 296 Unlawful discriminatory practices (1)(a) still says what it has always said, and but for the addition of 296(1)(h) the liability standards would remain the same:

1. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory pract i ce: (a) For an employer or licensing agency, because of an individual's age, race, creed, color, nat i onal origin, cit i zenship or immigrat i on status, sexual orientat i on, gender ident i ty or expression, military status, sex, disability, predisposing genet i c characterist i cs, familial status, marital status, or status as a vict i m of domest i c violence, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensat i on or in terms, condit i ons or privileges of employment.

Now, harassment is defined in a separate subsection of 296, and it states that (1) it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: (h) For an employer . . . to subject any individual to harassment

because of an individual's [protected category] or because the individual [has engaged in protected activity] regardless of whether such harassment would be considered severe or pervasive under precedent applied to harassment claims. Such harassment is an unlawful discriminatory practice when it subjects an individual to inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual's membership in one or more of these protected categories. The fact that such individual did not make a complaint about the harassment to such employer. . . shall not be determinative of whether such employer . . . shall be liable. Nothing in this section shall imply that an employee must demonstrate the existence of an individual to whom the employee's treatment must be compared. It shall be an affirmative defense to liability under this subdivision that the harassing conduct does not rise above the level of what a reasonable victim of discrimination with the same protected characteristic or characteristics would consider petty slights or trivial inconveniences.

A significant purpose of the amendment is to remove the reasoning—no prohibition of harassment—which courts assumed required them to create rules of liability, as well as liberally defining the elements of a hostile work environment.

Read together §300 and §296(1)(h) mandate employer liability for any harassment as defined by §296(1)(h).

§300 states that: The provisions of this article shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal civil rights laws, including those laws with provisions worded comparably to the provisions of this article, have been so construed.

It goes on to require that: Exceptions to and exemptions from the provisions of this article shall be construed narrowly in order to maximize deterrence of discriminatory conduct.

Focusing solely on liability, the important part is the Exceptions clause. Now that the Legislature has created a separate subsection defining harassment and making it illegal in employment, this is an injunction to jealously protect our new rights—which we failed to do after passage of the 1991 NYCHRL. It also provides us the means which is a clear statement of the Legislature on how the new subsection should be construed: narrowly in order to maximize deterrence of discriminatory conduct. In other words, just exactly as we wrote it.

The first clause of §300 is an instruction to construe similar provisions to federal law as stated, however, §296(1)(f) is not similar to any federal law.

Changes to Substantive Provisions Which Support Employer Liability

The changes to the substantive provisions suggest that the Legislature sought radical change. Removal of the severe or pervasive standard, and the affirmative defense that the Plaintiff didn’t complain. _ Don’t even think about a F/E defense is how the defense bar and courts (in dictum) are interpreting the “didn’t complain” clause. That makes no sense if distinctions between supervisor and coworker liability have been eliminated. It is more likely that the Legislature was simply sick of seeing

victims treated as criminals for not complaining. The complaint or lack thereof could be just as relevant under a negligence analysis, it need not reference F/E.

The employer’s only affirmative defense the harassment did not rise above the level of what a reasonable victim of discrimination with the same protected characteristic or characteristics would consider petty slights or trivial inconveniences. Stronger than NYCHRL.

Becker, which I’ll discuss in a few minutes, illustrates how the addition of “with the same protected characteristic or characteristics” changes the analysis: the court and jury is required to walk a mile in the Plaintiff’s shoes. Slights can become less petty if you are disabled.

Such harassment is an unlawful discriminatory practice when it subjects an individual to inferior terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual's membership in one or more of these protected categories.

The Courts are already very familiar with that language from the RA, which like §300 instructed courts to accord at least as favorable a construction to similarly worded federal or state law: treated less well _ ala Williams _ , federal is a floor beneath which we cannot fall.

Nothing in this section shall imply that an employee must demonstrate the existence of an individual to whom the employee's treatment must be compared. _ This could help, may not have been intended to modify the hostile work environment definition but it does and could be useful.

296(1)(h) does away with two other burdens of proof Plaintiffs previously carried.

Plaintiff no longer has to prove the hostile work environment was subjectively offensive. Plaintiff wouldn’t be here if it were not subjectively offensive. This should do away with the offensive double standard the Meritor court created where other protected classes just had to show they were offended but women had to prove that they did not welcome the harassment. You still see this, references to how a Plaintiff dressed, does

that welcome unconsented touching. It should be gone but if it comes up under federal law shoot it down, its an equal protection violation, not applied to men.

It recasts Plaintiff’s former burden of proof of “objectively offensive” as an affirmative defense, and gives the employer very little wiggle room to excuse offensive conduct because it must be judged from the perspective of the Plaintiff in the protected class.

Further evidence the Legislature sought radical change is that the definition of a hostile work environment effectively overrules the Court of Appeals construction in _ Forrest _ of retaliation, and reduces both hostile work environment and retaliation to the answer to the simple question posed in §296(1)(h) was the Plaintiff subjected to inferior terms or conditions, ie, treated less well than persons outside her protected class.

Becker-Rendano v. NYS Off. of Info. Tech. Svcs, 904264-20 (Alb. Sup., March, 2, 2021)( Patrick Sorsby of NELA/NY for Plaintiff, included in materials ) is the most important case construing the amendments I found for two reasons. The court agrees that 296(1)(h) legislatively overrules the previous NYS standard for retaliation, and it shows how powerful the addition of “with the same protected characteristic or characteristics” can be.

In Becker Plaintiff was legally blind and hired to serve as accessibility tester. she requested that defendant hire a “Support Services Assistant” (hereinafter SSA) to provide her with Braille interpretation as an accommodation that would enable her to perform the essential functions of the job. Plaintiff received other assurances probably short of promises. This is taken directly from the AC:

25. Plaintiff’s supervisor . . . would demean the Plaintiff by routinely going to her SSA with questions regarding Plaintiff’s Braille translation software and hardware. This is demeaning because they knew that Plaintiff trained the SSA on said equipment and had far superior knowledge of this equipment and software.

26. This is just one of many examples where the Employer treated the Plaintiff like a child who was incapable of making important decisions; and went around her to her SSA with questions and tasks

that were solely within the purview of the Plaintiff to answer.

Hostile Work Environment

In paragraph 25 above it states “This is demeaning because they knew that Plaintiff trained the SSA on said equipment and had far superior knowledge of this equipment and software.” Ordinarily when you have to explain to the court why a statement was demeaning you are not going to meet severe or pervasive and possibly not get past petty slights or inconveniences. But 296(1)(f) levels the playing field by requiring that the severity of the hostile work environment be measured as experienced by someone in Plaintiff’s shoes: what a reasonable victim of discrimination with the same protected characteristic or characteristics would consider petty slights or trivial inconveniences.

Becker was a MTD and the court refused to address the Defendant’s affirmative defense, however when you put yourself in Plaintiff’s shoes, Defendant’s conduct seems much more than petty. Plaintiff had a major disability, and with her accommodation was expected to properly perform the core functions of her job. Being circumvented by your boss when you have so little margin for error takes on a whole different feel when you put yourself in Ms. Becker’s shoes.

Retaliation

Becker is that it is the first case to hold that by including in §296(1)(h) among the protected classes which may not be harassed persons who had engaged in protected activity, the Legislature overruled decisions such as Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind . 3 NY3d at 313 [2004]; Suricl v Dominican Republic Educ. & Mentoring Project. Inc. . 85 AD3d 1464,1466 [2011]), which required a showing that the plaintiff suffered a “materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.”

Among protected classes the amended statute includes: “any individual who has opposed any practices forbidden under this article or because the individual has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article.”

All Plaintiff had to show was that because of her complaint she was subjected to an inferior term or condition which someone outside of her protected class. When she complained she was ignored and thus treated

differently. The same supervisor who refused to work within the guidelines which had been agreed, allegedly responded to her complaint by suggesting that plaintiff develop a sense of humor about her disability. Id. at 7.

It is easy to imagine how this standard could affect the evaluation of employer behavior in retaliation claims. When someone complains to their employer that they are out of printer toner the employer responds by supplying toner. However, when someone complains about a violation of employment discrimination laws, the first thing Human Resources does after the Plaintiff leaves the office is review her personnel file to see what the Defendant has against her. It does not go looking for dirt against employees who have not filed a complaint. A look through Plaintiff’s personnel file would probably not constitute a “materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment,” even if something negative was found and used, such as tardies. This is a sea change in the law of retaliation.

Three other cases which evaluate the new hostile work environment are Cunliffe v. Sandberg, 2022 NY Slip Op 32035(U), ¶ 3 (Sup. Ct.)(MTD, Plaintiff was a live out nanny: “Under the NYSHRL's current standard, [mother]'s comment about the color of plaintiff's face and her encouragement of her son to make similar comments on several occasions are sufficient to state a claim for hostile work environment.”) and Weekes v. Jetblue Airways Corp., No. 21-CV-1965 (MKB), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167723, at 36-37 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 16, 2022)(“Plaintiff alleges that Defendants ‘creat[ed] a hostile work environment’ because of his requests for accommodation for his disability and that Green and Ayala, among others, treated him less well by ignoring his complaints and requests for accommodation,” state a claim under amended NYSHRL).

See also Ndongo v. Bank of China Ltd., No. 22-cv-05896 (RA), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31238, at 23-24 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2023)(incorrectly concluding that allegedly offensive statements made to African American woman that do not reference race or gender could not meet pleading standard “because of,” when the test is whether persons outside her protected class were treated less well, and citing pre amendment authority)

There are a lot of cases stating in dictum that is clear the legislature

intended that the amendment be construed in much the same way as the RA required the NYCHRL be construed, which is encouraging. 1 However, we must remind the court of the major difference between the statutes, which is that 296(1)(h) expressly defines an employer as liable for a hostile work environment.