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The Ragged Edge of Rugged Individualism: Wage Theft and the Personalization of Social Harm (University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 2021) (Part 2 of 3)

Part 2 of 3

III. BARRIERS TO ACTION AND THE FAILURES OF REFORM

For almost a year, Maynor worked at Eastern Flavors, a midrange restaurant in the District.161 As with many restaurants, though, the attractive exterior gilded ugly inner truths. Maynor’s employers only paid him about half of the minimum wage, and he never got overtime despite working up to 70 hours a week. When Maynor eventually complained about the conditions, they fired him. “They even tried to fight me when I left,” he says. “They threw soy sauce at me.”

Some of Maynor’s friends told him about an attorney they trusted. When Maynor went to talk to this lawyer, he realized just how badly he had been mistreated. Over the course of the year, Eastern Flavors underpaid Maynor by about $25,000—money he sorely needed to support himself and his family in one of the most expensive places in the country.163

Maynor and two of his former co-workers sued. Eastern Flavors refused to settle, and the case went to a four-day trial. Maynor and his friends prevailed, and the judge ordered the restaurant to pay them more than $150,000, plus attorney’s fees.164 Maynor alone won almost $100,000, an extraordinary amount of money for a

man who had been making $5 an hour just a year earlier. When we spoke more than fifteen months later, Maynor had only recovered a third of this judgment. This was still enough to change his life, and he and his attorneys were preparing to place a lien on his former employer’s property to recover the rest.

Maynor speaks glowingly of his lawyers and the process. “It’s an example for everyone because so many people are afraid to go talk to a lawyer,” he says. “And so they just suffer, and they suffer. They live in fear with their arms crossed, but afterwards I felt really good because the law is the law, and what’s correct is correct.”

Maynor’s story is the one we like to tell. It represents the best that anti-wage theft reforms have to offer. It is inspiring, a Davidand-Goliath tale of hardship, struggle, and vindication. Maynor’s employers violated his basic rights and exploited his vulnerabilities, and he was abused even beyond the basic degradation inherent in wage theft. But through dedication and courage, he brought to bear the full weight of the law and found justice. In the end, it did not matter that Maynor speaks almost no English, has little money, is almost certainly undocumented, dropped out of school in the second-grade, and has no legal knowledge. Because of the District’s’s recent anti-wage theft reforms, he received compensation not only for his lost wages, but for the trouble he had to go through to get them, and he did not have to pay any money for the outcome. Maynor simply reached out, placed his hands on the levers of power that the law made available, and walked away much better for it.

This tale fits neatly into the belief that private legal remedies can effectively solve social problems. But this story is also extremely rare, the strong exception to a stark truth: under the current system, the overwhelming majority of low-wage people who experience wage theft have no real avenues for recourse.

The reforms discussed in Part II have been broadly accompanied by a sense of accomplishment among those who pass them. In some ways, this feeling is well-deserved. This new wave of laws reflects an earnest desire to address wage theft, to grant working people the tools they need to enforce their own rights, and to create fair and dignified workplaces. When invoked and enforced, anti-wage theft reforms upend the age-old power dynamic and provide aggrieved workers with a real path to redress.

But there is a crippling problem with an approach that depends—and in fact requires —low-wage workers to drive enforcement. The fact is, low-wage workers overwhelmingly lack—or at

least believe they lack—the practical ability to hold their employers accountable for violations of their rights. As this Part explains, an enforcement regime based on the misconception that individual empowerment is an acceptable way to address a problem like wage theft is fundamentally flawed because the vast majority of low-wage workers do not take formal legal action over their rights violations. There is no question that the statutory reforms discussed in Part II are important. But, as long as remedies emphasize personal empowerment and a complaint-based approach to enforcement, they will fail, afflicting little more than a surface-level attack on the problem.

A . Wage Theft, Disputing, and the Safe Path of Silence

To fully grasp why the standard approach to fighting wage theft is destined to fail, it is crucial to understand when, why, and how people take action over their own mistreatment. Or, in this case, why so many do not.

Sociolegal scholars who study the civil justice system have spent a great deal of time analyzing the process through which people “name,” “blame,” and “claim”—that is, when and how people recognize an injury (name), assign responsibility (blame), and take action (claim).165 This research has revealed that there are many potential legal disputes that people never act upon.166

Disputes are social constructs. Whether a given situation will evolve into a legal claim depends heavily on social context and personal understandings.167 An extensive body of research on disputing shows that the ability and willingness to name a problem, blame somebody for it, and bring a claim depends heavily on who somebody is and how their thinking has been influenced.168 As sociologist Rebecca Sandefur explains, “studies frequently . . . reveal powerful influences of local social context on how disputes are understood and pursued.”169

This “local social context” can greatly impact how a person thinks about and responds to their experiences. Many factors mat-

ter, including widespread cultural beliefs, a person’s own background and upbringing, socioeconomic status, and race.170 Also important are “agents of transformation”—people and organizations, including nonprofits, friends, and government officials, who shape, guide, and manage beliefs and expectations.171

This analysis really boils down to questions of power and influence. If a person who is wronged has more social power and resources and has been encouraged to think about an experience as a legal problem, then they are more likely to take action. Members of groups that are lower in the social hierarchy (like poor people, those without much formal education, and minorities) perceive fewer problems and make fewer claims.172 For example, we would expect an upper-class white person whose mother is a lawyer to be more likely to file a lawsuit or administrative complaint than a lowincome person of color who does not know any attorneys. To some extent, this divergence is about resources and the kinds of problems people have. Wealthier people are better equipped to pursue legal action and are also more likely to have disputes with higher stakes. But these factors do not fully explain the entire relationship between class position and action. Lower-income people are also less likely to pursue disputes because of a general sense of powerlessness and a lack of faith in the system.173

Wage theft represents a potential dispute, which workers may recognize (name), assign responsibility for (blame), and pursue through a variety of formal and informal processes (claim). In light of the attention that wage theft has received, we might expect lowwage workers to regularly take legal action over their pay-based rights violations. After all, there has been a growing social movement dedicated to empowering these people, both legally and personally, and the interventions discussed in Part II of this Article have been designed for just that purpose.

But this is far from the case. Overwhelmingly, people who suffer wage theft do not take any legal action.174 Despite the harm of the crime and its (often flagrant) illegality, almost no low-wage workers step forward.

Unlike some other potential disputes—e.g., a faulty product involving multiple potential responsible parties—”blaming” for wage theft is straightforward. People understand that their employers

are responsible for paying, or not paying, their wages. Instead, the real problems for disputing wage theft arise at the “naming” and “claiming” phases.

B . Naming Wage Theft

Naming an act of wage theft as an injury is a crucial first step to action. Before a person will assert their rights, they must understand what those rights are and how they have been violated. A wealth of empirical research supports the idea that “inaccurate or incomplete knowledge of the law can limit one’s willingness and ability to assert their rights.”175 For example, in her study of the Family and Medical Leave Act, sociolegal scholar Catherine Albiston found that people who had basic information about their rights felt more empowered.176 Rights awareness itself provided workers with both a legal and moral justification for speaking up.177

Research concludes that many low-wage workers do not have a clear understanding of their workplace rights. One analysis found that almost 60% “misunderstood their minimum wage and overtime rights,” with people frequently overestimating and underestimating the applicable minimum wage.178 Significant gaps in understanding exist even among undocumented workers, for whom law is particularly salient and who are frequently the targets of know-your-rights outreach efforts.179 A survey of day laborers determined that 45% did not know the applicable minimum wage and 21% did not realize it is illegal to pay less than minimum wage. Fewer than half knew both of these facts.180

Confusion over substantive rights commonly arises in conversations with low-wage workers. Jack, for example, has been embroiled in a dispute with his former employer, a large and successful restaurant. Jack played two roles, working as both a server and a caterer. “In catering I was probably putting in about 20 hours a week,” he explains, and “[w]ith the waiting tables I was probably

putting in 30 hours a week.”182 Separately, that is. Working 50 hours a week for a single employer means that Jack should have been paid for ten hours of overtime. He was not, but Jack did not realize that this was illegal. Instead, he viewed his two roles as independent of one another, even though both his basic job duties and his employer stayed the same.183 As a result, he never pursued a claim for unpaid overtime.

Not knowing the law is not the only barrier to naming. Workers must also understand that their particular situations are illegal. Even some who know their rights fail to realize that their own experiences constitute mistreatment. It is not easy or convenient for people to track their hours, check their own records against their paystubs, and do the weekly math required to verify that they are being paid correctly.184

In short, lack of knowledge is a significant problem in a system reliant on worker complaints. But there is also a great deal of nuance missing from this discussion. Despite the research presented here, it is also the case that—at least in D.C.—low-wage workers are largely aware of their own wage theft. This might sound contradictory. How can a group of people with poor knowledge of their rights also be generally aware of their own mistreatment? The answer lies in the fact that wage theft is usually nothing more than a violation of a person’s most basic entitlements. Although “wage theft” is an umbrella term that covers many different offenses, the most common forms violate our country’s oldest and most rudimentary workplace laws.185 These laws are longstanding and also coincide with our own cultural and moral understandings of how things should be. In other words, it does not take much knowledge to understand the wrongness of the broad range of violations that low-income people suffer. Beyond that, even if workers do not immediately identify that their rights are being violated, they often become aware after the fact.

Most of the time, then, the real barrier to action is not a lack of knowledge, especially in a place as progressive and socially active as D.C., where there are many sources of information available to teach people about their rights, including radio and bus advertisements, non-profit and advocacy organizations, and friends and coworkers. Even as the details of these laws escape workers, who

sometimes misstate the applicable minimum wage or fail to understand how quickly they accrue paid sick days, most people who have been cheated eventually learn of it.

This discussion raises questions. People who experience wage theft are deeply affected by it. In many places, like the District, there are also powerful, pro-worker laws designed to ease the path to civil justice, send a powerful message about the wrongness of wage theft, and provide redress. And yet, working people do not take formal legal action. They do not pursue the remedies enshrined in law. Across the board, complaint rates are extremely low.186 One study found that almost 98% of workers who perceive workplace rights violations (consisting mainly of wage theft) do not pursue their claims through the civil justice system.187 Why? In the age of an ascendant left-wing in Democratic politics with growing pro-worker grassroots movements, economic inequality and the experiences of working people are the focus of a national conversation, and this attention has resulted in sweeping reforms. So why, then, do workers fail to take action? As the next section explains, the real barriers to individualized enforcement arise at the claiming phase.

C . Barriers to Claiming: Retaliation, Lack of Confidence, and Power Dynamics

The majority of low-wage workers who name their legal injuries give up at the claiming phase. During the claiming phase, a worker confronts the person or entity who they blame for their wage theft and demands a remedy.188 Claiming can take a variety of forms and includes everything from talking to a supervisor to filing a lawsuit.189

Analyzing data from the 2008 survey of 4,400 low-wage workers, Charlotte Alexander and Arthi Prasad concluded that only 57% of those who felt their rights had been violated at work made any

kind of claim in the year prior to the survey.190 Of those who did speak up, 96% did so informally by speaking to their employers.191 Only four percent of those who made claims, then, tried to take the kind of formal legal action envisioned by the reforms discussed in Part II. Parsed out, this means that of all the low-income workers in the survey who believed their employers broke the law, only about two percent went to the government or a private attorney for help.192

There are three significant “barriers to claiming” that effectively prevent low-income people from taking legal action. Working people frequently report that what stops them from really pursuing rights enforcement is: 1) fear of retaliation; 2) concern about navigating the system successfully; and 3) a lack of personal power and faith in the government.

These barriers to claiming are not mutually exclusive but overlapping. Fearing retaliation, for example, is inherently linked to a perceived lack of power and faith in government. After all, if a person believed they had the power to enforce their own rights, or had confidence that the government could and would protect them, they would not be afraid of employer reprisal. What these issues, discussed in more detail below, have in common is that they are all inextricably tied to workers’ low positions on the social and economic hierarchies that structure society.

1. Fear of Retaliation

The biggest explanation for why low-wage workers do not attempt to assert their rights, either at all or to a significant degree, is because they are afraid of retaliation.193 Retaliation can take many forms. Supervisors bully and intimidate workers who complain, cut their hours, adjust their schedules without warning, contact immigration authorities, and find excuses to terminate, suspend, or otherwise discipline them.

While all retaliation is intimidating and unpleasant, the worst— and most effective—is the kind that reduces earnings. Especially for those who live in poverty or just on the edge of it, income is an

overriding concern. Low-wage workers have little—if anything—in the way of savings,194 and, as discussed in Part I, even a temporary loss of income can have a devastating impact on a person’s way of life. Many times, even a bad employer who steals wages is better than no employer and the looming prospect of debt, hunger, and homelessness.

Workers, wage theft attorneys, and workers’ rights activists well understand these facts. Joanna Blotner, an advocate at Jews United for Justice in Washington, D.C., speaks for many when she explains that

for most people, the most important thing is keeping whatever the bare minimum income is, keeping that job. It’s much worse to be out of a job and start that search process over again and scramble for income in the in-between. . . . Losing a job is almost guaranteed losing housing, losing whatever other supports and bills you’ve got to pay in your life.195

Fear of retaliation reflects the power imbalance inherent in employer-employee relationships and is also justified by data. Approximately 43% of respondents in the landmark study of 4,400 lowwage workers reported suffering employer retaliation as a result of their most recent workplace-related claim.196 Many workers in the District also speak at length about their experiences with retaliation and how they have learned that enduring wage theft can cost less than fighting it. In total, just under half of my respondents expressed being afraid of retaliation.

Ruben, for example, was used to long hours at the Homeless Youth Retreat, a non-profit organization.197 A large, cheerful man, he speaks passionately about the mission of the organization and his willingness to put forth time and effort. “[W]ithin a two-week period, I was knocking out hours, like 88, 96, 104, 112,” he says. “I was crushin’ ‘em!”198 Ruben, however, earned the same rate for every hour he worked,199 no overtime, even though he was not exempt. At first, he tried to talk to his supervisors about it. “Fuck

you,” one of them told him. “We not paying you, man. You lucky we paying you that!”200

For many, this would have been the end of it. But Ruben could not let it go. He is college-educated, a veteran, and he knew he was right. He filed a wage claim with the D.C. DOES, which eventually determined that his employer owed him about a thousand dollars, plus penalties.201 After some negotiations mediated by the agency, Ruben walked away with about $2,500 before taxes.

That was still not the end of his saga, though. “[N]ow that all the smoke has cleared, I’m not getting more hours,” Ruben says.203 He has gone from working more than 80 hours every two weeks to only a single shift. “I want to play it off, but one day?” Ruben asks, incredulous. “Just one day? I got scheduled two days a month? I’ve been with you more than fifteen years and that’s all I get called for? Is this retaliation behind me going to court?” Ruben does not think he can prove it, but he got the message: “I don’t argue no more. I stopped arguing.”

Others have similar stories. James, a grocery store employee, noticed his paychecks were missing hours. He spoke up multiple times, and although his employer repeatedly paid him back, his supervisors became increasingly hostile. They cut his hours; transferred him to a store far from his home; and cooked up reasons to yell at, abuse, and punish him. “I’m almost afraid to ask for my money, and it shouldn’t be like that!” he says, his frustration plain. Would he speak up again? “[I]t does discourage you. . . . I got my check that’s coming up next week, it’s going to be messed up . . . . And I’m not going to say anything. I’m going to leave it alone.”205

Retaliating against a single outspoken employee can have a powerful ripple effect. Targets get the message, but so too do their coworkers. Like James, Miranda’s employer began to cut her hours after she complained that her paycheck was short.206 Some of her coworkers wanted to take action over the same problem but ultimately did not. “[T]hey was scared of the backlash,” Miranda explains, “[like] how they shortened my hours.”207

We think of low-wage jobs as ubiquitous and therefore easy to find because they require few skills, have a high turnover rate, and

there is a low barrier to entry.208 This way of thinking implicitly assumes that if a worker loses their job, they can easily find another similar one. Broadly speaking, this might be true. It might be the case that in the aggregate, low-wage people are able to find new jobs relatively quickly. But the interim between leaving one job and starting a new one is frightening, even if it only lasts a week or two, and many report that economic insecurity buys silence. Marcos, for instance, spent years working as a dishwasher, and explains that although he felt “terrible” about his wage theft, he had to put up with it because he “didn’t know where else to look for work.”209

This generalized fear worsens when people have particular points of vulnerability that leave them especially open to exploitation. Being older, having dependents, or having a criminal conviction are all the kinds of qualities that make a person particularly vulnerable. Marion, for example, was convicted of a sex offense and also struggles to support her son.210 “It’s hard because I have a record now, and sometimes I don’t get [interviews], sometimes I get interviews that go well, sometimes they be like ‘I can’t hire you because of your background.’ “211 At her last job, Marion was not exempt from overtime under either D.C or federal law, but her employer only paid her for 40 hours a week, even though she worked about 60.212 She sometimes went hungry and often had to scrounge or borrow bus money so she could go to work.213 Although Marion knew she could file a complaint with the D.C. DOES, she did not. “I was like, ‘I’ll take the experience because I need it on my resume,’ “ she explains.214

Perhaps the biggest inflection point for worker exploitation is immigration status, which helps explain why foreign-born workers are especially susceptible to wage theft. In Wage Theft in America , author and activist Kim Bobo discusses this issue:

Because our nation has no rational immigration system providing a path to citizenship and no strong worker protections for immigrants, many immigrants find themselves in vulnerable situations. They are desperate to work to support themselves and their families; at the same time, they face enormous backlash from communities that are scapegoating the nation’s economic woes on immigrants (not a new approach in U.S. history), and they are terrified of being deported. This creates a context that makes it easy for employers to exploit undocumented workers.216

For an unscrupulous employer, the cheapest labor comes without papers. Undocumented immigrants can be—and frequently are— paid less than the minimum wage, or nothing at all, because employers understand that many of these people live in fear of the law. This situation constitutes what Professor Elizabeth Fussell dubs the “deportation threat dynamic,” where employers assume, often correctly, that the Spanish-speaking people they hire will not report wage theft because they are afraid of government authorities.217

Concerns over retaliation exist even in places with powerful antiretaliation laws. The District, for instance, prohibits “any person acting on behalf of the employer” from threatening or punishing any person who has made a complaint or “is believed to have made a complaint” to any person alleging that they have not been paid properly.218 This is a broad prohibition. Read plainly, it covers not only workers who go to the government or file a lawsuit, but also those who informally complain to their supervisors that they have been underpaid.

But retaliation is a hard thing to prove. Along with almost every state, the District practices at-will employment, which means that employers can fire workers for almost any reason or for no reason at all.219 It is easy for employers to come up with alternative, plausible excuses for why somebody has been let go or had their hours reduced, understanding that the real reason can be shrouded behind the logic of at-will employment. Even when the District government finds out about alleged retaliation, it is slow to act. In fis-

cal year 2019, the DOES took an average of 42 days to even contact employers accused of retaliation and 117 days to resolve those complaints.220 Many times, this is too little, too late. Given the precarious nature of low-wage workers’ lives, the damage has already been done before the agency reaches out to the employer.

2. Concerns Over Navigating the System

“I live in a world of fear. So, I haven’t really worked steady in a while,” says Agda, who moonlights as a bartender while pursuing an advanced degree.221 “I have a kid to support and bills to pay. The stress level is insurmountable some days, you know? It’s really hard.”222 As is common in the service industry,223 Agda’s employers have, over the years, stolen her tips, paid less than promised, and paid less than minimum wage.224 Like many, Agda is aware of her rights and expresses anger over these acts. But despite this, she has never taken formal legal action.

[I]t’s a lot of work . . . a lot of follow up. They want this, they want that, then they want to call the employer and then it’s like, you know, either you’ve moved on from that job and you just don’t want to deal with it anymore, you don’t want to see them anymore, or it didn’t end well anyway . . . . [Y]ou just don’t want to deal with it, you know? There’s a lot of mental aspects to it.225

These feelings are common. Legal claims are time consuming and intimidating, and many low-wage workers report that they do not pursue their legal claims because they feel ill-equipped to navigate the legal system. Among those I spoke to, more than half (55%) named this barrier to claiming, which has two aspects: workers lack the procedural knowledge of how and where to assert their rights, and they are also—like Agda—intimidated by the prospect of legal action.

Many ordinary people do not understand even the basics of how to bring a lawsuit or make an administrative claim. For most, a law-

suit is out of the question. Even filing one is complicated, to say nothing of the many processes that follow.226 The confusing nature of the legal system, after all, is a big part of the reason why people hire lawyers.

In theory, agencies like the DOES are supposed to provide a softer and more accessible avenue for rights enforcement. In practice, many workers are unsure of how to even take the first step to trigger these agency procedures. Charlotte Alexander and Arthi Prasad found that 77% of surveyed low-wage workers did not know how or where to file a complaint about their workplace issues.227 In short, “low-wage, front-line workers often lack the legal knowledge” to meaningfully enforce their own rights.228

This is partly due to the confusing and sprawling nature of the administrative state. There are multiple federal agencies that regulate workplace civil rights, including the DOL, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). To make things more confusing, there are also parallel state-and city-level agencies. In the District, there is the DOES, the Public Employee Relations Board, and the Office of Human Rights.

As with low-wage workers in general, many people in the District do not know where to begin to figure out how to assert their rights. “I don’t know where I should go or to whom I should talk,” says Sabbir, a former fast food worker who never got overtime.229 “And maybe there’s a way we can fight about it, but I don’t know the way, how I should start, or how to do it.”230 Even those who are familiar with, for example, the DOES express confusion. Cora, who we met in the Introduction, speaks well of DOES and has participated in a variety of agency-run programs designed to help out-of-work residents. But when asked whether she might file a wage claim, she expresses confusion: “I don’t know. And I wouldn’t know how to do it.”231

But workers who know what they can do are nevertheless reluctant to take formal legal action because they are not confident that they can successfully navigate the system. Like Agda, these workers are not held back by a lack of procedural knowledge but a desire to avoid a process that is intimidating, confusing, time-consuming, and emotionally draining. The path of least resistance often in-

volves ignoring the problem or moving on. In many ways, and for many people, it is easier to swallow the frustration and pain of wage theft than to deal with the hassle of fighting an uphill battle.

For example, Miranda worked at a large department store that frequently underpaid her.232 After it happened once, she started to carefully track her hours in a notebook. Four or five times, she used her own records to confront her supervisor; four or five times, her employer cut her a check.233 Not surprisingly, Miranda was not alone. “[My supervisor] gave me a check, and after I did it, four other people had to get checks!” Miranda says. The employees got together and talked about filing a group complaint with DOES, but ultimately gave up the idea. “I thought about going to the wage and labor board,” she explains,

because a lot of people were complaining about it and I thought, ‘there’s power in numbers.’ If a group of us feel that we’ve been treated unfairly, then probably it’d be quicker than it just being one person. But of course, mostly everybody at that point that was going through the same injustice I was going through just wanted to get the hell out of there.235

Eventually, that is what Miranda herself did, deciding it would be simpler and easier to just move on to a new job.236

3. Lack of Power, Lack of Faith

The last major barrier to claiming is that many low-wage workers do not believe that speaking up will do any good. Agitating at work or filing a complaint is not likely to achieve justice, and worse, could carry significant costs. There are also two aspects to this barrier to claiming: First, low-wage workers have a keen understanding of the stark power imbalance that exists between them and their employers; second, they lack faith in the government, and do not believe that it will protect or advocate for them.

As discussed in Section III.C.1, this imbalance is amplified when a person is economically or socially vulnerable, which explains why wage theft is more pronounced among the working poor, undoc-

umented immigrants, non-unionized employees, women, and minorities.237 As Maria, a cleaner, puts it, “[employers] have the money, they have the power, and it’s your word against their word so I don’t think there’s anything you can really do about it.”238 Employers understand this power imbalance, and many use it to their advantage. When Ameen’s former boss, an ambassador to the United States, taunted him by inviting him to file a lawsuit over his unpaid wages,239 the ambassador was relying on the fact that Ameen has very little money and no legal knowledge. When Cora’s supervisor threatened to fire her after Cora demanded her wages,240 she was sending a clear message about speaking up. Employers like these, who refuse to comply with the most basic workplace laws, do so confidently because they can do so with impunity. It is a theme that activists and attorneys see repeatedly. Allen Cardenas, who coordinated a legal clinic that focuses heavily on wage theft complaints, explains that:

Fear and intimidation [are] what threaten[] workers the most. . . . They usually have family to support, they have bills, and they don’t have the time to stop working and find a new job if they raise hell at their current job. Stability’s important for them, and I understand why you’re scared to ruffle some feathers, because it could cost you your job and it might mean that your kids can’t eat.241

Workers hear these messages loud and clear, and they understand how employers strategize around this power dynamic. “[W]hen people know they can take advantage of others to their own benefits, and they know the other person is kind of scared to even reach out or even find information, they have what they want,” says Naomi, summing up the perspective of many.242 This power imbalance, of course, also feeds into the fear of retaliation that many people have. As discussed above, retaliation can take many forms and be hard to prove, and workplace disputes often come down to one person’s word against another’s. This is thin proof upon which

to risk a claim and, perhaps even worse, retaliation. One stakeholder describes a typical retaliatory event:

When you’re told you’ll be taken off the schedule, it’s not like you’re getting a formal e-mail in writing where you have any proof of this. It’s an interpersonal conversation, oftentimes with nobody else around to hear. It’s your word against theirs, so workers have very little power to react against it, to push back, to prove offensive retaliation where it is happening in the workplace.243

This present lack of power that many people feel is compounded by the second aspect to this barrier to claiming: many low-income people lack faith in the government and do not trust it to serve them well. In D.C.—as well as many other places—this belief is justified by the poor job that the government does at enforcing basic wage and hour laws. This might sound surprising. After all, the District recently passed one of the most powerful anti-wage theft laws in the country.244 But the fact is, D.C. and many other governments are largely inactive.245 Responsible agencies fail to build lasting relationships around the issue, investigate wrongdoing, process complaints quickly, and vigorously apply the law.

The numbers from the District tell the story of a government agency failing its mandate. In the District, the sub-agency responsible for investigating and remediating wage theft is the Office of Wage-Hour (OWH), which is contained within DOES. OWH has about 30 full-time employees and an annual budget of approximately $3.6 million.246

These might sound like large numbers, but they are inadequate compared to the frequency and impact of wage theft. OWH simply does not have the staff or money that it should. Beyond that, though, the agency itself does a poor job of enforcement. In particular, there are three serious problems with OWH, which are likely repeated in dozens of places across the country, and which contribute to workers’ lack of faith in the government.

First, OWH misses the overwhelming majority of instances of wage theft. By its own numbers, it does not learn of more than 99.5% of all minimum wage violations, receiving fewer than 100 complaints while conservatively estimating that there are nearly

40,000 violations per year.247 And although employers commit wage theft in all its various forms with stunning frequency, the agency receives only 700–800 wage theft-related complaints total each year.

Second, workers who go to OWH experience significant delays and problems, leaving many feeling cast aside and ill-served. To be fair, OWH has made improvements to its timeline in recent years, and in fiscal year 2019 even adhered to the statutory requirement that it issue an initial ruling within 60 days of serving an employer with a complaint.248 In crucial ways, though, it is slow and inefficient. It takes about 51 days to serve an employer. Worst of all, retaliation complaints languish. On average, it takes the agency about 117 days to resolve complaints—including six weeks to even make initial contact with the employer.

Olivia experienced these delays firsthand. After she filed a claim for unpaid wages using DOES’ online form, she heard nothing for three weeks.249 Eventually, she contacted OWH, who put her in touch with the investigator in charge of her case. Over the next several weeks, he asked her questions she had already answered and requested documents she had already submitted—in some cases more than once.250 In particular, it was clear that the agency had lost the key pieces of evidence she had attached to her initial complaint, including her offer letter, pay stubs, and termination letter.251 It took the agency seven weeks to even issue a complaint to her former employer, and for the next six months she saw almost no movement on her claim.252

There are real costs to this beyond the aggravation of slowmoving justice. A great deal can happen in a short amount of time, especially to vulnerable people. For example, after Lisa, a counselor at a transitional living facility for teen moms, successfully pursued a claim for unpaid overtime through OWH, her employer, a faith-based non-profit, suddenly and illegally evicted her from the apartment complex that the organization housed its employees in.253 Lisa wound up living in her car, depressed, hungry, and des-

perate.254 She filed a retaliation complaint with OWH, but it never went anywhere.255 She saw some movement early on, but only in the face of Lisa’s “persistent persistence.”256 “I would push it [forward],” Lisa explains, “then I would stand back because I didn’t want to go through the pain” of having to constantly pursue justice.257 Almost two years after the fact, Lisa had given up on the agency resolving her retaliation claim one way or the other. “There’s no driving force from their end . . . ,” she says.258

The third crippling problem with OWH is that the agency imposes light judgments and collects little money. District law states that the government “shall” (meaning must 259) require employers who steal wages to pay aggrieved workers liquidated damages equal to triple their unpaid wages.260 The only way employers can avoid this mandate is by admitting their fault when the agency first contacts them, which reduces the liquidated damages from 300% of unpaid wages to just 100%.261 Realistically, few employers take this route. Instead, the strong majority ignore the agency or contest the claims, meaning it is reasonable to expect that if OWH is applying the law as written, aggregate liquidated damages imposed by the agency will land much closer to 300% than to 100% of unpaid wages.

This is far from the case. OWH does not seriously sanction the bad actors who come before it. Last year, through its complaintbased process, the agency assessed about $483,000 in unpaid wages but only about $451,000 in liquidated damages.262 In other words, the agency does not even impose liquidated damages of 100% of unpaid wages against recalcitrant employers, much less the treble damages envisioned by the Wage Theft Prevention Act. Nor does OWH collect much money: During the same period of time, the agency took in about $194,000 in unpaid wages (40% of the total assessed that year) and only $70,500 in liquidated damages (15.5% of the total assessed).263

To summarize: DOES is unaware of the overwhelming majority of instances of wage theft that take place in the District. Because it, like many enforcement bodies, eschews proactive enforcement strategies in favor of passive processes,264 it rarely takes any action on behalf of those who suffer wage theft. This includes—by the government’s own estimates—more than 99.5% of workers whose employers pay them less than minimum wage. When people do complain, the agency is slow to contact their employers, process their cases, and protect them from retaliation. Finally, once OWH does process a person’s claim, it gives employers far more lenient punishments than are required by the law, failing to either impose meaningful judgments or enforce penalties and collect money.

The slow burn of this process breeds resentment among the class of people who have nowhere to turn but to the government for help. Frequently, those who go to DOES feel frustrated, disregarded, and ill-served. “It’s no good,” says Caleb, speaking about the agency’s employees. “[Y]ou come to work, but you don’t go to work! [I]t looks like, down DOES, looks like you’re going to church. Everybody dressed up, looking good, but you ain’t doing nothing!”265

Some people view the government and its employees as inefficient and unmotivated, if not outright lazy. But others take a much more cynical view. It is not just that the government is inefficient. The system itself is designed to favor the Haves at the expense of the Have-Nots.266 Earl, the journeyman plumber we met in the Introduction, is one such cynic. He describes a race to the bottom in the construction industry, where contractors refuse to hire District residents, deny overtime, pay unfairly low wages, and engage in rampant misclassification. “[T]hese companies that have come into this city to do work have no licenses to do work, but it’s okay for them to work,” he says.267 He does not mean that they are operating legally. Far from it. Earl’s point is that the city’s leadership is not interested in taking meaningful action. “There’s definitely a lack of political will! There’s something in it for them. I mean, every politician wants something out of it. If I’m gonna do something for you, what do I get out of it?”268

The notion that wage theft may be effectively attacked through policies of individual empowerment is consistent with the idea that

wage theft is a personal harm best addressed through the passive enforcement mechanisms of the civil justice system. But the fact is, workers who have their wages stolen do not come forward, even when the law reflects the gold standard of anti-wage theft reforms.

The barriers to claiming are serious, effectively precluding the vast majority of low-wage workers—even well-educated ones—from pursuing formal legal action. The common thread tying these impediments together is the low status that these people have on the social and economic hierarchies of society. But while these problems are significant, they are not insurmountable. There are concrete policy changes that would effectively address these concerns. The next Part details what changes must be implemented if jurisdictions want to do more than just attack wage theft at the margins.

IV. REFORMS IN CONTEXT

This Article has debunked two key ideas about wage theft. First, that it is rightly understood as an individual harm; and second, that wage theft can be and should be addressed through policy choices that, on their face, empower or incentivize private actors to enforce the law. Although workers’ rights advocates broadly understand that these premises are false, they are still powerful and influential, and drive both formal legal reform and how the government enforces workplace laws.

“Bottom-up workplace law enforcement,”269 which necessarily depends on low-wage workers holding employers accountable, is destined to fail in its current form. Because of the significant barriers that effectively preclude the vast majority of low-wage workers from bringing formal claims, this approach will only ever, at most, attack wage theft on the margins. By and large, the workers who do come forward and pursue formal rights enforcement fall into two groups. First, they are people who have experienced wage theft that is, to them, uniquely severe or offensive. Ameen, for instance, did not pursue formal legal action until his unpaid wages crested $40,000 and threatened him with homelessness.270 Lisa stayed silent until one egregious week where she worked dozens of hours of overtime and still received only her base salary.271

The second group consists of those workers who have left their jobs. At that point, the calculus of risk changes dramatically; retaliation stops being an overriding concern, and for some, the poten-

tial monetary and emotional benefits of bringing a claim start to outweigh the expected costs. Recall Maynor, whose eventual wage claim ultimately resulted in a $100,000 judgment in his favor.272 Although his wage theft was blatant and damaging, he did not take action until his employer fired him.

Despite these practical realities, most government agencies rely on a passive, complaint-based approach to enforcement. This is an inherently reactive strategy: the government waits for workers to report their employers for wage theft, and then acts to bring those specific employers into compliance. It is also ineffective.

But this situation is neither hopeless nor intractable. To meaningfully attack wage theft, jurisdictions must re-orient how they think about and address it. They must understand, first, that wage theft is a widespread social problem that requires a public response. Statutory legal reforms are important, but they must reflect this fact and, in recognition of the practical barriers to private enforcement, empower institutions to action—not just private individuals. Those institutions must also recognize the inadequacy of passive, private enforcement schemes and adopt a model of strategic enforcement, which focuses on shifting entire industries by costeffectively bringing justice to workers instead of waiting for them to step forward. This Part outlines the bare minimum of legal and strategic reforms that jurisdictions should implement if they hope to meaningfully address this problem.

A. Statutory Changes: Adopting the District of Columbia’s Enforcement Regime

Standing alone, the District’s statutory reforms are insufficient. But they are still a crucial first step, and any jurisdiction concerned about wage theft must, at a minimum, adopt them.

To reiterate, D.C. created a legal framework that, on paper, promises aggressive rights enforcement. It imposes significant fines and penalties and entitles claimants to recover three times their unpaid wages as damages. Furthermore, the District’s recordkeeping requirements and generous fee-shifting provisions make it easier for a larger class of people to find legal representation and prove their claim. Perhaps most importantly, D.C.’s recent reforms significantly expanded the power of the government to find and punish wage theft. The Office of the Attorney General has inde-

pendent enforcement authority,274 and the DOES has broad power to investigate, punish, and remediate wage theft.275

The quantitative and qualitative facts about wage theft in the District underscore how these reforms have not, for many, lived up to their promise. But the city’s legal framework has the potential to be incredibly effective and contains tools that could be—and sometimes have been—wielded to great effect. Jurisdictions that wish to meaningfully enforce basic workplace standards should, at a minimum, adopt these same reforms.

B. Additional Reforms: Misclassification and Private Institutional Action

Because individuals are extremely unlikely to even attempt formal rights enforcement, reforms should empower institutions with new authority. This institutional response should come primarily from public entities, which are able to collect, distribute, and leverage resources in a way that most private actors cannot. But there are also non-governmental institutions that can and do play an important role in labor standards enforcement.

In particular, workers’ rights-based non-profit organizations and labor unions are naturally incentivized to find and prosecute wage theft. These institutions are ideologically motivated to protect the rights of working people and, additionally, unions are directly threatened by employers whose labor practices are illegal. This is especially true in the construction industry because contracts are typically assigned to the lowest bidder, and contractors can cut their costs by nearly one-third just by misclassifying their employees.276 Legal reforms should do more to leverage these institutional actors by creating qui tam causes of action regarding independent contractor misclassification.

As discussed in Part I, misclassification is a common form of wage theft. In addition to the problems already discussed, independent contractors are responsible for paying a higher tax rate on their earnings than employees. Employees and employers share the burden of payroll taxes, with each paying 7.65%; in contrast,

independent contractors, must pay the entire 15.3% themselves.277 These costs quickly add up: a misclassified worker making just $20,000 per year can expect to pay an extra $1,530 in taxes.

In most jurisdictions, it is too difficult for private actors to recover the cost of these extra taxes from employers because they cannot sue for them. There simply is not a cause of action.278 A misclassified worker’s only real option is to fill out various forms with the IRS.279 The IRS is then supposed to investigate the situation and determine whether the filer is an employee or independent contractor.280 After that, the IRS might adjust the worker’s tax liability.281

This process is less direct and more complicated than it should be. Future legislative changes should both 1) enable misclassified employees to directly sue their employers for overpaid taxes and 2) incentivize institutions to action through qui tam provisions.

Qui tam provisions empower private actors to file civil lawsuits to enforce a government interest.282 They are most commonly associated with the federal False Claims Act, although they harken back to thirteenth century England.283 Under the False Claims Act, either the Attorney General or a private party (called a “relator”) may sue a third party who has (allegedly) defrauded the government by making a false claim for payment.284 After the relator files suit, the government has 60 days to investigate and decide whether it will prosecute the case. If it does, then the relator may still participate as a party and is entitled to recover up to 25% of the final damages plus reasonable attorney’s fees.286 If the government pass-

es on the case, the relator may pursue it and, if successful, recover up to 30% of damages plus attorney’s fees.287

Applying these same principles and procedures to the issue of independent contractor misclassification would serve the public interest in three ways. First, it would fill a gap in the law, creating a way for workers to recover for a distinct harm. Second, it would provide a powerful tool for attacking and redressing bad behavior by further incentivizing institutions to bring charges. Not only would the government learn about viable cases, but non-profit organizations, labor unions, and private law firms have knowledge, resources, and power that individual victims of wage theft do not, and therefore have power that ordinary working people lack. Finally, such suits would recover unpaid taxes.

C. Strategic Enforcement: Moving Beyond A Passive Approach

Written legal reforms can only do so much. As important as protective statutes are, it is just as crucial that policymakers adopt enforcement strategies that acknowledge the realities of wage theft and account for the barriers that, for all practical purposes, prevent individual rights enforcement. Most government agencies do not do this, however. As discussed in Part II, wage and hour enforcers largely employ a passive, complaint-based approach.

This is a fundamentally inadequate way to combat wage theft, but it is not the only one. In the ongoing conversation about policing labor standards, there is a concept known as “strategic enforcement.” In summary, strategic enforcement is about the effective use of limited resources to achieve the long-term goal of enhancing compliance with basic workplace laws.288 It is “a deliberate approach to change the practices of wage violation that have become commonplace in certain industries,” and it does so by “tak[ing] account of industry-specific business models, dynamics, and regulations with the goal of creating ripple effects that will influence the compliance behavior of a number of employers at once.”289

In part, strategic enforcement requires government agencies to adopt new enforcement strategies. But they must also adopt a longterm mindset, with the goal being to create ongoing, sustainable compliance.290 To that end, agencies must do three things: 1) allo-

cate resources where they will have the most impact; 2) focus on changing the behaviors that result in legal violations in the first place; and 3) find mechanisms and implement strategies that create ongoing compliance.291 This requires agencies to shed their long-held passive habits in favor of proactive enforcement efforts, shifting resources toward active strategies with the specific goal of establishing a robust presence and creating industry-wide cultures of compliance. As Professor Janice Fine explains, however, “[t]he crisis of compliance in low-wage industries will not be solved by the state alone.”292 To be successful, strategic enforcement “require[s] creative collaboration between government, workers, organizations, and—where they exist and are willing to participate—highroad firms.”293

These ideas might seem intuitive and obvious. But in practice, the idea of strategic enforcement stands in stark contrast to how most government agencies tasked with remedying wage theft operate,294 including DOES and similar entities across the country. As discussed above, most agencies essentially play whack-a-mole with bad employers, only going after them when workers volunteer information. But low-income people almost never file complaints with agencies.

Reactive approaches do not prevent wage theft as effectively as proactive ones. They also leave workers open to harm because, by definition, the government enters the equation only after employers violate the law and workers put themselves at risk. While this is also true of the civil justice system, unlike courts, many government agencies have the explicit authority to seek out violations and proactively protect workers’ rights.295 Unless and until they do so, wage theft will continue to run rampant in and wreak havoc on the lives of working people.

The remainder of this Part outlines the most important strategic efforts that government agencies can make to achieve long-term deterrence. As discussed below, a smart and systematic strategy requires these entities to: 1) build confidence among stakeholders, including workers, community organizations, advocates, and em-

ployers; 2) engage in proactive investigations; 3) educate workers about their substantive and procedural rights; 4) utilize all available enforcement tools and publicize such activity; and 5) adopt an express anti-wage theft mindset.